

DCI/IC 73-1158

Executive Registry

73-6407

October 9, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

SUBJECT: Talk on ICS Function

I have been asked by a member of the management of the Institute for Defense Analyses to talk to a group there informally -- but classified -- regarding the IC staff function. I would like to accept.

AD/DCI/IC

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Approved WFC

10 OCT 1973

Disapproved _____

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IC STAFF

9 - 10 November 1973

Discussion began at 2:00 p.m.

General Graham opened discussions by expressing his view of the IC present posture and general guidance under which future activity should be conducted.

a. DCI is turning increasingly to IC for Staff support, i.e., NIPM preparation, as an expression of Community resource issues to the President; KIQs as an evaluative tool; post-mortem exercise; and current crisis reporting.

b. IC must view itself as not only DCI's, but particularly Mr. Colby's right arm in Community matters. The personal identification will tend to lessen the "bureaucratic approach."

Guidance -- In undertaking IC assignments the following guidelines were given:

a. Avoid internal workings of CIA.

b. Undertakings must be the "Most Important Doable" ones.

Criteria for judging importance and "doability"

- . Did DCI direct? Does it support his objectives?
- . Will it improve customer relations - and result in better intelligence?
- . Will it enhance the collegiality within the Community?
- . Are there provisions for the resource implications?
- . What are the institutional barriers? Can some part less than the whole be undertaken?
- . Must not be utterly opposed by CIA Deputies.
- . Is it within the Staff's competence (numbers and capability?)

c. Quality of Work - should be relied upon to make the impact.

- . Thorough disciplined staff work.
- . Maintain an image of highly professional responsive professional capability.
- . Maintain high staff morale by worthwhileness of effort, appreciation of senior staff, and high level visibility of individuals where appropriate.
- . Willingness to cancel false starts.
- . Identification and release of underachievers.

d. IC Image - and fact must be complete neutrality.

- . Avoid setting one against another in the Community.
- . All individual interests must be considered and contacts with all entities maintained.
- . Balanced staffing - representative of Community interests.
- . Periodic display of service uniforms -- particularly USIB day and in outside contacts.

e. Where cliques exist -- eliminate!!

f. Argue until decision is made -- then support!!

General Graham identified two problem areas, which a new Staff organization is designed to address:

1. Lack of coordination.
2. Identification of any one Group's projects.

25X1 [] as Principal Deputy for Program Development and Operations, will be the focal point for the totality of the IC activity and coordination is to occur through him. General Graham's specific interest will continue to focus on analysis; [] on technical aspects of Community's systems; and [] on management of resources -- their individual inputs to IC activities will be on a selective basis. All effort will be made to coordinate among General Graham, [] but it is the responsibility of individuals to provide feed-back to [] as the focal point for IC coordination.

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Following General Graham, [] summarized the concepts which had governed IC's early months, equating with Dr. Schlesinger's tenure as DCI. The emphasis had been placed on the need for an improved product, and visibility of the Community's resources -- as the President had directed in his 5 November charge. Internal coordination had not been of critical concern, and that a general staffing requirement of [] professionals, divided into four groups seemed appropriate. As the net assessment responsibility disappeared, a complement of [] professionals and [] secretarial was accepted, with the mix of professionals proportionate to dollars in the National Program. Initially two-year tours appeared to be desirable, and that relatively young, middle-grade personnel were to be recruited. Ideal arrangements would provide non-reimbursable loans as opposed to permanent staffing for the IC mission.

Following [REDACTED] surfaced briefly the key issues which the conference was designed to address. These included:

- . How to make IC one office.
- . The Principal Action Officer/Collateral Action Officer concept.
- . How to present an IC integrated image to Community entities.
- . What should IC be by 1975 (size and competence)?
- . How does IC interrelate with NIOs?
- . Total space footage currently planned is probably adequate.
- . Present budget appears adequate, but best use of our resources must occur.
- . Prioritizing of projects can be aided by paper-flow discipline.
- . Christmas party!!

The following discussion took place: [] inquired (1) whether the DCI's Presidential objectives had been distributed within the Community, and (2) what could be done to truly measure IC output in a proper time frame.

General Graham advised that the only restriction on Community Objectives was prior to their approval. Now that this has occurred, he sees no existing prohibition to distribution. With respect to measuring IC output, [] was referred to General Graham's overall guidance for the discipline in selecting undertakings, with doable and most important stressed.

25X1 [] reviewed the survey of personnel assets which comprised the major part of the reference books which were furnished all attendees. Concern was expressed that the Group tasks contributing to DCI commitments were not weighted. There was general agreement that the tabulation was a useful technique and General Graham instructed that more work be done on refining and prioritizing the commitments and that Group tasks be reviewed for adequacy and accuracy of data. []

25X1 [] then described his approach to the personnel profiles which were included in the reference books and commented on the paucity of data from which these were prepared. This generated a number of comments on proper categories of desirable capabilities and the application of this visibility technique to identifying flexibility within IC. General Graham requested that further work be done on refining this display of staff assets. There followed a brief discussion on methods of identifying potential IC candidates. General Graham assigned responsibility for identifying possible recruits to the individual Group Chiefs. []

25X1 [] suggested that employees without intimate knowledge of intelligence might be an interesting cross-fertilization approach.

The afternoon session closed with [] suggesting that a flexible staffing policy would be more truly responsive to the IC mission. A sufficient flexibility of contract options could assure the appropriate talent or the appropriate time. Further consideration of this was tabled for Saturday's schedule.

After a two-hour dinner period the group again met to consider presentations of the three Group Chiefs.

25X1 . [] addressed PRG, its mission and staffing. Generally it appears that not only PRC, but IC is over-extended in its tasks. While his present staffing proposal reflects matching one-for-one the NIO structure, in response to General Graham's question, [] agreed that the further overall diminution of "product" is an input to PRG's staffing requirements -- and whether or not this can be accomplished by a geographic structure is questionable. How ad hoc assignments can be appropriately responded to is another concern. [] commented on the perceived need for in-depth "philosophy of review" papers, which would think through the PRG process and develop a general philosophy of approach.

PRG

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General Graham's response to this presentation was his view of the criticality of the NIO success in which IC has a critical role, and cautioned against IC approaches which had no end product. To guard against this all undertakings should be addressed to the following three orders of requirements and in the following sequence:

1st Order Requirement - Has someone asked a question?

2nd Order Requirement - If so, what follows? What are sub-questions; what gaps exist?

3rd Order Requirement - What kinds and quantities of data are needed to answer the above?

Past IC performance would indicate too much attention to the 3rd Order Requirement.

General Graham requested PRG to rethink its Geographic/Analytical/Substantive requirements and in timing with other Group Chiefs resubmit staffing proposals.

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. [] presented his views of the CCG mission, recognizing two of the DCI's "musts" as (1) product, and (2) resources. He sees the IC's overall mission as developing system of priorities, resource allocation and evaluation of performance. The CCG role in the above as assuring a closed loop in the total process, stemming from the resource charge and its essential role in Community judgments. The constraints imposed by the budgetary process must be recognized. In order to perform the CCG function, some degree of continuity and a responsive reporting system are required.

General Graham commented that he recognized resources as the end-question, and that the central position of CCG was indisputable. Notwithstanding this, the resource issues were not synonymous with substantive issues, and that we must make certain we do not get caught up with preoccupation in the "budgetary game," or the "decrement syndrome."

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[] observed that the process within which we work - the dichotomy of substance and resource was dysfunctional and needs to be avoided in our office structure if we are to properly serve the DCI.

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. [] addressed the PEG function by describing the essential capabilities required of any PEG professional: (a) high technical competence, (b) capability of high-level communications, and (c) familiarity with both computer and processing technologies.

25X1 General Graham discussed a lack of clarity with respect to the conditions under which PEG activity should be undertaken. The PEG end-product as an input to both PRG and CCG missions. The reality of ad hoc studies, the benefits of which also feed the Product and Resources mission of IC. Whether the primary focus of PEG activity could be identified as addressing intelligence efforts, or intelligence systems was explored. [] indicated the need to develop a scheme to prioritize projects, and introduced the concept of contractual arrangements for particular talents for particular time periods. There was further discussion on how to properly evaluate the output of PEG, what should the staffing profile be, and where did one acquire the talent, particularly under a contractual arrangement. The question of how is and how should PEG be tasked closed the discussion.

Saturday, 8:00 a.m.

25X1 [] outlined a number of administrative actions which he was implementing in order to improve the coordination of IC communications and facilitate office routines. Among these were paper-flow and IC tasking of USIB, and in turn USIB Secretariat's responsibility to keep IC Staff informed in a timely basis. [] was requested to examine the latter and devise, with [] a scheme for accomplishing.

General Graham expressed the desire that IC should work toward presenting a coordinated image particularly.

Other administrative matters covered by [] were: 25X1
a centralized OMB liaison, the discontinuance of the morning report, a more effective control of overtime by Group Chiefs, a formal system for project prioritizing, the IHC/IC relationship and other USIB Sub-Committee arrangements and structure, the display center concept and the R&D Council's activation.

25X1 By 16 November Group Chiefs were requested to re-examine staffing requirements in light of the discussions and concepts expressed, and provide, through [] their views on number and levels of personnel.

